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INTEREST OF AMICUS 
RINCE, YEATES 
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Centre I, Suite 900 
East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Valley Mental Health, Inc., ("Valley") is a nonprofit 
corporation charged with the responsibility of providing mental 
health services to clients in Salt Lake and Summit Counties. It 
provides child and adolescent outpatient and acute and intensive 
care through thirty treatment and ten residential units. In 1989, 
Valley Mental Health provided services to more than 50,000 clients. 
By contract with Salt Lake County, Valley Mental Health provides thei 
statutorily mandated mental health services required in Salt Lake 
County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89. 
The mission of Valley Mental Health is to improve, enhance, 
and promote the emotional well-being of individuals in Salt Lake and 
Summit Counties who experience life-disrupting problems due to 
mental illness and to strengthen the quality of their personal, 
family, and community life. Were this Court to hold that an entity, 
like Valley Mental Health, which provides mental health services to 
clients, is liable to unidentified victims of the violent acts of 
its clients it would substantially impair the ability of Valley 
Mental Health to realize its mission by increasing the likelihood 
that preventive detentions will occur at the expense of clinically 
based therapeutic client care. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ADDRESSED BY AMICUS CURIAE 
Valley Mental Health seek's this Court's affirmance of the 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake County, Salt 
Lake County Mental Health, Dr. William Kuentzel, Sheryl Steadman, 
-2-
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The University of Utah and the University of Utah Medical Center 
(the "Salt Lake County and University defendants")• The issue which 
Valley will address as amicus curiae is whether the appellees, all 
mental health providers, owed a duty to take precautions to protect 
Shaundra Higgins, an unidentified victim, from the violent acts of 
Carolyn Trujillo. 
This issue, which concerns the existence and scope of a 
legal duty, is a matter of law which may be examined independently 
by this Court without deference to findings or conclusions entered 
below. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Valley believes that the interpretation of the following 
statutes substantially bears on the existence and scope of mental 
health care providers to protect unidentified third parties from the 
violent acts of mental patients. The complete text of these 
statutes is set out in the addendum to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-89 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-101, et seq. 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-1, et seq. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-21 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-34 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-36 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 
-3-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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This is an appeal of a summary judgment entered by Third 
District Court Judge James Sawaya in favor of the appellees on the 
grounds that as mental health providers, the appellees owed no duty 
to protect Shaundra Higgins or her mother from Carolyn Trujillo, a 
mentally ill person who was receiving treatment as a voluntary 
patient from Salt Lake County Mental Health and who stabbed Shaundra 
Higgins. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following are facts which Valley believes to be 
relevant to the issue of duty addressed by it as amicus. Valley 
contends that neither the Salt Lake County nor University defendants 
owed a duty to Shaundra Higgins or her mother. For the purpose of 
assessing whether this duty existed, Valley assumes that each of the 
appellees treated the assailant, Carolyn Trujillo, in a manner 
inconsistent with the appropriate standard of care. Accordingly, 
Valley's Statement of Facts will not address the quality of care 
given Ms. Trujillo. 
Because this case was decided on summary judgment, those 
facts which are relevant to the issue of the appellees' legal duty 
are considered in the light most favorable to Shaundra and Kathy 
Lynn Higgins. (Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 
864, 866 (Utah 1988) .) 
1. On February 25, 1984, Salt Lake County Mental Health 
admitted Carolyn Trujillo to its Adult Residential Treatment Unit 
-4-
("ARTU"). ARTU was a group home providing a structured residential 
environment supervised by an on-site staff which administered 
medications and conducted behavior modification and group programs 
for patients. (R. 2375, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 10-12.) 
2. In mid-March 1984, Ms. Trujillo was discharged from 
ARTU and returned home. She agreed to attend Tuesday and Thursday 
evening therapy through ARTU's "evening-weekend" program. (Depo. 
Romero, Vol. II P. 48, Romero Vol. 1, pp. 80, 83, 87.) 
3. Despite its structured setting, ARTU was less 
restrictive and did not compromise the civil liberties of patients 
to the degree typically experienced as an inpatient in a hospital. 
(R. 2373, Depo. Whittaker, pp. 84-85; R. 2371, Depo. Steadman, p. 
79; R. 2376, Depo. Ely, p. 89). 
4. Carolyn Trujillo*attacked and stabbed Shaundra Higgin$ 
on April 10, 1984. At the time of the stabbing, Ms. Trujillo was a 
voluntary patient of Salt Lake County Mental Health. (R. 2371, 
Depo. Steadman, pp. 177-182.) 
5. Prior to the attack Carolyn Trujillo did not manifest 
to the Salt Lake County or University defendants, or to its 
therapists, any threat of violence against Shaundra Higgins. 
According to her written statement describing the attack, Carolyn 
Trujillo was stimulated to attack Shaundra Higgins by "voices" which 
she heard immediately before the attack and which instructed her to 
"hurt someone." 
-5-
6. Carolyn Trujillo was found guilty and mentally ill to 
attempted criminal homicide, manslaughter, a third-degree felony, 
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years. (R. 1233, 
Exhibit 1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Consistent with traditional principles of common law, Utah 
does not require that a person control the conduct of another or 
warn potential victims of his acts. Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1989). The "special relationship" exception to this 
principle is limited to situations in which a defendant has a "legal 
right to control" the acts of the third party. 
None of the appellees had the legal right to control the 
conduct of Carolyn Trujillo and therefore owed no duty to Shaundra 
Higgins. 
Utah statutes governing the admission and discharge of 
patients to mental health facilities underscore the limited scope ofl 
a mental health professional's duty to the victims of the violent 
acts of patients. The enactment in 1988 of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14a-101, et seq. codified Utah's common law and public policy 
by recognizing that therapists have no duty to take precautions to 
protect unidentified potential victims of patients and by limiting 
the therapist's duty to that of the duty to warn potential victims 
who have been reasonably identified in threats of physical violence 
made by patients. 
-6-
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This scope of duty of consistent with the Legislature's 
concern that the liberty interests and right to treatment of the 
mentally ill be compromised only in the face of compelling evidence 
of immediate dangerousness when the result would be preventative 
detention. 
In addition to the statutory constraints, clinical 
considerations, particularly the unsparing commitment to treatment 
and well-recognized difficulties in making accurate predictions of 
long-term future dangerousness, properly motivate therapists to be 
wary of exercising "control" over patients. Were the expansive duty 
urged by the appellants to hold sway, the result would be an 
inevitable increase in nontherapeutic confinements of the mentally 
ill, an outcome directly at odds with the Constitution, law, and 
public policy of this state. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF A MENTAL HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S 
DUTY TO THE UNIDENTIFIED POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF THE VIOLENT ACTS 
OF PATIENTS IS A LEGAL ISSUE SUBJECT TO THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS 
AND DECISION FREE OF FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE 
QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED THE ASSAILANT. 
The dispositive issue in this appeal, and the issue most 
charged with potential clinical repercussions for Valley, is whether 
the University or Salt Lake County defendants owed a legal duty to 
Shaundra and Mary Lynn Higgins. Whether this duty existed is 
"entirely a question of law to be determined by the court." Ferree 
v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989), citing Weber v. Springvillf 
City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). 
-7-
Of course, this Court's analysis of the existence and 
scope of the alleged duty may draw on many sources in aid of 
reaching a principled decision, including precedential authorities 
and social policy. (See, Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333 
(D.Colo. 1983), citing Prosser, Law of Torts § 43, 257 (4th ed. 
1971), with approval for proposition that the question of whether a 
legal duty should be imposed necessarily involves social policy 
considerations.) The central focus of any duty analysis bears on 
the characteristics of the relationship among the parties. In this 
case the two critical facts that define relationships are 
unambiguous and uncontroverted. Carolyn Trujillo was a voluntary 
patient, and she made no threat of harm against anyone. The 
University of Utah Hospital emergency room treated Ms. Trujillo as 
a voluntary patient on February 25, 1984. Salt Lake County Mental 
Health provided voluntary treatment to Ms. Trujillo through 
programs offered by its ARTU unit. Ms. Trujillo attacked Ms. 
Higgins at the direction of "voices" which she heard immediately 
before the assault, which took place more than three weeks after 
her discharge from ARTU. 
The appellants devote nineteen pages of their brief (pages 
7-26) to a recitation of "facts" relating to Ms. Trujillo's history 
of mental illness and alleged substandard care provided by the 
University and Salt Lake County defendants. Neither these "facts" 
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nor the arguments built around them relate to the existence or 
scope of duty that might have been owed by the University and Salt 
Lake County defendants to the Higgenses. Opinion testimony 
challenging as insufficient the degree of "control" exercised by 
the University and Salt Lake County defendants and offering up the 
opinion that these defendants should have established a closer or 
more "special" relationship with Ms. Trujillo should not deflect 
this Court from considering the issue of duty based on the 
relationships among the parties as they actually existed. 
2. THE CONTOURS OF THE DUTY TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE HARM 
CAUSED BY THE ACTS OF THIRD PERSONS AS FASHIONED BY THIS 
COURT IN SETTINGS OTHER THAN THOSE INVOLVING MENTALLY ILL 
PERSONS DO NOT ENCOMPASS THESE FACTS. 
Utah law conforms to the traditional common law principle 
that places a defendant under no duty to take precautions to avoid 
harm when to do so would require exercising control over the 
conduct of another or warning others of their peril. Our law has 
adopted, however, the two exceptions to this rule recognized in 
Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which arise if: 
(a) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and 
the third person which imposes a duty upon the [defendant] to 
control the third person's conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and 
the other which gives to the other a right to protection from the 
third person. 
-9-
Hale v, Allstate Ins, Co., 639 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1981) (Quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1964)). 
This Court has analyzed the scope of the "special 
relation" exception in the contexts where peace officers who 
stopped but did not arrest an intoxicated motorcyclist prior to a 
fatal accident (Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); 
where corrections officers who authorized weekend release for a 
resident of a halfway house who bludgeoned his victim to death 
(Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); and where Division of 
Family Services officials who had received accusations of abuse 
against babysitter who severely battered a child (Owens v. 
Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989)). In each instance, this Court 
held that no duty was owed the plaintiff to control or warn. Two 
of these decisions, Owens and Ferree, affirmed summary judgments. 
No Utah appellate decision has confronted the issue of 
third-party duty in a mental health setting. Each of the cases 
cited above, however, contributes compellingly to the conclusion 
that no duty was owed by the University and Salt Lake County 
defendants to Ms. Higgins. In Christenson, the Court declined to 
impose a duty of due care toward the decedent, an intoxicated 
motorist. The sheriff's deputies who encountered the decedent 
clearly had the right to exercise control over him had they so 
desired. Certainly, in an era in which drunk driving has become 
-10-
particularly opprobrious, the deputies were under no obligation to 
be sensitive to the deceased's liberty interests. This situation 
is markedly different from that of the mental health worker whose 
inclinations to restrain, detain, and confine must, as the 
discussion below develops, be constantly weighed against the 
liberty interests of his patient. 
Owens is instructive for its determination that no duty 
was owed to the unidentified potential victim of the babysitter's 
conduct as long as the Division of Family Services had no legal 
right to control her. The University and Salt Lake County 
defendants likewise had no legal right to control Ms. Trujillo. 
The Owens plaintiffs also sought unsuccessfully to invoke state and 
federal child abuse prevention statutes, claiming that they created 
independent statutory duties and that they lent support to their 
common law duty assertions. Although the state Child Abuse 
Prevention Act clearly mandated aggressive DFS response to 
allegations of abuse in an effort to protect children generally, 
the Court found that no relationship giving rise to a cognizable 
duty under the statute arose unless a specific victim is 
identified.- As discussed below, at the time of this incident, 
i/ Justice Zimmerman wrote separately to distance himself from 
the majority opinion's apparent holding that statute would support 
the creation of a legal duty when a specific victim is 
identified. 784 P.2d 1187, 1193. 
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Utah had adopted an expansive body of law dealing with the 
voluntary and involuntary treatment of mentally ill persons. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-1, et seq. These statutes, unlike the Child 
Abuse Prevention Act, did not have as their primary purpose the 
protection of unidentified victims of the acts of mentally ill 
persons. 
In dictum, the Owens court suggested that because the 
statute was enacted for the purpose of protecting children, DFS may 
owe a duty to children who are identified as needing protection. 
The statute does not, however, concern itself with the liberty 
interests of the perpetrators of abuse. Once the potential victim 
is identified, DFS may be expected to secure legal control over the 
perpetrator with reasonable zeal. By contrast, even if the mental 
health statutes were enacted for the purpose of protecting the 
victims of the acts of mentally ill persons, the explicit statutory 
safeguards of the liberties of the mentally ill render the duty 
even more tenuous here than in the child abuse setting. 
The Ferree court addressed a situation in which legal 
control was present—the assailant was a halfway house resident in 
the custody of the Department of Corrections—but nevertheless held 
that no duty existed because the defendant did not know the 
identity of the assailant's victim. As in both Christenson and 
Owens, no concern for treatment or liberty interests was present to 
mitigate the right or ability to exercise control. 
-12-
In sum, the relevant Supreme Court authority supports the 
trial court's finding that the University and Salt Lake County 
defendants owed no duty to Ms. Trujillo's unidentified victim. 
3. SOCIAL POLICY AND CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING THE 
OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING TREATMENT TO MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN 
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE SETTING POSSIBLE, THE IMPRECISION WITH 
WHICH DANGEROUSNESS MAY BE PREDICTED, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF 
UNNECESSARY PREVENTIVE DETENTION COMPEL THE REJECTION OF THE 
DUTY SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A thorough assessment of the social and clinical policy 
considerations is relevant, even critical, to the analysis of the 
propriety of imposing a duty to control mentally ill persons who 
have made no threat against an identifiable victim. The 
traditional common law limitations on a person's duty should not 
give way to the "special relation" exception and the resulting 
expansion of affirmative duties without "a careful consideration 
of the consequences for the parties and society at large." Beach 
v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986). 
The Beach court further justified its wariness of the 
"special relation" exception with an observation of particular 
relevance to this case. The Court stated: "If the duty is 
realistically incapable of performance, or if it is fundamentally 
at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship, we should be 
loath to term that relationship 'special' and to impose a 
resulting duty, . . ." Id. That exercise of "control" over a 
mentally ill person may be in fundamental conflict with the 
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objectives of the psychotherapist-patient relationship is a 
concept that lies at the heart of the duty analysis in this case 
and is an issue which finds expression in judicial opinions, 
psychiatric literature, and Utah statutes. Illustrative of the 
majority view rejecting the "special relation" duty in a voluntary 
treatment setting is this commentary on the 
psychotherapist-patient "control" dilemma: 
The typical relationship between a psychiatrist 
and a voluntary outpatient would seem to lack 
sufficient elements of control necessary to bring 
such relationship within the rule of Section 
315. Indeed, lack of control by the therapist 
and maximum freedom for the patient is oft times 
the end sought by both the psychiatric profession 
and the law. 
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F.Supp. 999, 1009 (D.Md. 1982). 
Recent articles in the psychiatric literature have 
addressed the increased control and compromised freedom that has 
accompanied the application of the "special relation" duty excep-
tion to psychotherapists since Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal 1976). 
Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D., likely the most respected commentator on 
the issues surrounding the duty to protect, has noted that "con-
cern about potential liability is leading some clinicians to 
participate in the creation of a system of preventive detention 
for persons thought likely to commit violent acts." Appelbaum 
PS: "The New Preventive Detention: Psychiatry's Problematic 
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Responsibility for the Control of Violence." Am J Psychiatry 
1988; 145:779-785. Although nontherapeutic preventive detention 
may reduce the risk of liability and offer society an added 
measure of safety, Dr. Appelbaum presents a "negative side of the 
ledger . . . crowded with more easily demonstrable factors." Id., 
783. The darker side of preventive detention includes hospitali-
zations of persons unlikely to benefit from inpatient treatment, 
misallocation of scarce resources, disruption of treatment 
programs, and impairment of staff morale and competence. 
Empirical support for the conclusion that nontherapeutic 
hospitalizations are commonplace appears in a study comparing the 
frequency of civil commitments jurisdictions using a dangerous-
ness-oriented commitment standard with those which have enacted 
commitment criteria which abandon the dangerousness element. The 
findings revealed that significantly more patients were committed 
under the dangerousness criteria, a result attributed to 
tendencies to overpredict dangerousness, i.e., to hospitalize 
patients who are not dangerous. Hoge SK, et al: "Limitations on 
Psychiatrists' Discretionary Civil Commitment Authority by the 
Stone and Dangerousness Criteria"; Arch Gen Psychiatry 
1988;45:764-769. 
The long recognized imprecision in predicting a mental 
patient's "dangerousness" compounds the likelihood of preventative 
-15-
detention and magnifies its invidious social and constitutional 
consequences. 
The results of research published over the last two 
decades support the conclusion that little headway has been 
achieved in the quest to predict dangerousness. The most recent 
psychiatric literature continues to suggest that even attempts to 
predict immediate dangerousness are largely exercises in 
2/ 
speculation.— 
—
 S e e
 American Psychiatric Association Task Force Report, 
Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 28 (1974) (90% error 
rate "unfortunately . ". ". is the state of the art"); Steadman, 
Predicting Dangerousness Among the Mentally 111, 6 Int'1. J. L. & 
Psychiatry 381-90 (1983). See generally Wettstein, The Prediction 
of Violent Behavior And The Duty To Protect Third Parties, 2 Beh. 
Sci. L. 291 (1984); Scott, Violence in Prisoners and Patients, 
Medical Care of Prisoners and Detainees, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439 
(1975); Rector, Who Are the Dangerous? Bull. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 
186 (July 1973); Justice & Birkman, An Effort to Distinguish the 
Violent from the Nonviolent, 65 S. Med. J. 703 (1972); Kozol, 
Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 
18 Crime & Delinquency 371 (1972); Rubin, Prediction of 
Dangerousness in Mentally 111 Criminals, 27 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 
397 (1972); Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a 
Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 Am. J. Psychiatry 10, 
11 (1984); Monahan, Social Policy Implications of the Inability to 
Predict Violence, 31 J. Soc. Issues, 153, 157 (1975); Kirk, Allen, 
MD: The Prediction of Violent Behavior During Short-Term Civil 
Commitment, Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1989); 
Cocozza, J, Steadman, H., The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions 
of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, Rutgers L. Rev. 
27:1084-1101 (1976). 
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Clearly, the reliability of any dangerousness prediction 
diminishes substantially as the forecast moves beyond the 
immediate to a more remote future. The daunting obstacles to 
making a "scientific" prediction of dangerousness beyond the 
immediate future have a direct bearing on the imposition of a duty 
on a psycho-therapist to make such a forecast. As a practical 
matter, if a duty were found to exist, the difficulties inherent 
in making a prediction of long term dangerousness would likely be 
overshadowed by the retrospective bias which would be the 
inevitable product of a patient's violent conduct. Knowing that 
the lens of hindsight is far clearer than that available to the 
forecaster, even the most liberty conscious psychotherapist may 
succumb to the temptation to impose preventive detention. 
Utah's statutory sensitivity to the liberty interests and 
need for treatment of the mentally ill reflects legislative 
rejection of preventive detention and a common law duty to 
control. The common law of duties owed by psychotherapists to 
third parties cannot be evaluated without considering the 
implications of Utah's comprehensive mental health statutes, Utah 
Code Ann. § 64-7-1, et seq. Principles of common law must yield 
when in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1. Utah's mental health statutes regulate 
and restrict the authority of psychotherapists, institutions, and 
-17-
the public to treat and restrain mentally ill persons. While 
these statutes may not be in irreconcilible conflict with the 
common law, they define its bounds and inform its substance. 
Constraints on the control of the mentally ill appear 
throughout Utah law. A person who attempts to improperly civilly 
commit a person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and is liable 
for damages, Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-21. Nontherapeutic detention 
of a mentally ill person is authorized only in emergency temporary 
commitment situations. A mental health officer or peace officer 
may take a person into protective custody only upon a showing of 
probable cause that there is a "substantial likelihood of serious 
harm to that person or others." After apprehension, a mentally 
ill person may be held on nontherapeutic emergency detention for 
up to twenty-four hours, but ohly upon a showing of "substantial 
and immediate danger to himself or others." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 64-7-34. A person suffering from a mental illness may be 
involuntarily committed only after a demonstration, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the patient "poses an immediate danger 
of physical injury to others or himself," that "there is no appro-
priate less-restrictive alternative to a court order of commit-
ment," and that treatment is available to meet the patient's 
needs. Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-36. 
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The mandate that a mentally ill person's liberty 
interests be safeguarded to the greatest degree possible is a 
strident theme throughout Utah's mental health law. The 
subjection of the patient to "control" is mandated, as the 
sections cited above indicate, only after rigorous criteria have 
been satisfied. 
When viewed against this statutory backdrop, the social 
and clinical failings of an expansive duty to protect become 
evident. Such a duty may well benefit society by preventing an 
occasional violent act. This benefit, however laudable, does not 
justify the inevitable retreat from the clear purposes of Utah's 
mental health laws. In the final analysis, the plaintiff's notion 
of common law duty directly conflicts with Utah law and must yield 
to it. 
Just as the body of mental health law which was enacted 
at the time of Ms. Trujillo's assault is an essential analytical 
tool in determining the existence and scope of the duty to pro-
tect, of equal significance was the Legislature's subsequent en-
actment, in 1988, of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-101 creating a duty 
to warn identifiable potential victims of physical harm. While 
the statute is not subject to retroactive application to this 
case, it represents codification of the common law of 1984. As 
argued above, this Court's holdings outside the mental health 
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setting, together with social and clinical considerations, and the 
language and purpose of Utah's mental health statutes, combine to 
discredit any duty to control patients as a precaution against 
harm to unidentified potential victims. The 1988 statute is 
consistent with this view. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) begins with the 
unambiguous declaration that a therapist "has no duty to warn or 
3/ take precautions . . . . " — This general disclaimer of duty 
accurately defines the state of the common law, particularly when 
no potential target of violence in need of warning or precautions 
has been identified. See, Owens v. Garfield and Ferree v. State, 
supra. 
The Legislature created the sole exception to this 
general rejection of duty in the next clause of § 78-14a-102(l). 
By fashioning a duty to warn on therapists who receive threats 
directed at reasonably identifiable victims, the Legislature 
codified what, by dictum in Ferree, supra, the Supreme Court 
indicated may comprise a common law duty. The scope of the duty 
1/ The appellants attempt to render the section inapplicable by 
asserting, in footnote 14 at page 40 of their brief, that the 
University and Salt lake County defendants are "institutions," not 
"therapists" and therefore outside the scope of the act. This 
argument is a practical cipher. An institution which employs no 
therapists will have no clients or patients who might communicate 
threats requiring warning and hence cannot encounter liability for 
violating the act. Institutions which employ therapists will be 
subject to the act under theories of vicarious liability. 
-20-
defined in § 78-14a-102(1) is clearly communicated by its 
language. The appellants contend, based on their reading of the 
legislative history of the section, that a therapist who breaches 
professional standards retains a duty to warn and protect, the 
statute notwithstanding. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11, 
the words and phrases used in statutes are to be "construed 
according to the context and the approved usage of the language." 
The word "no" has but one approved usage in the English language. 
"No" loses none of its clarity when used in § 78-14a-102(1) in the 
context "no duty to warn or take precautions." Unambiguous 
statutory language may not be contradicted by legislative 
history. Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1988). 
In short, neither the 1988 statute nor the common law 
which it codified recognized the notion of duty urged by the 
appellants, but instead each kept faith with the social and 
clinical imperatives that would make the imposition of the 
appellants' duty unwise policy and bad law. 
4. BRADY V. HOPPER PRESENTS A WELL-REASONED CONSIDERATION OF 
THE CLINICAL AND LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE DUTY TO PROTECT AND 
SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THIS COURT. 
Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333 (D.Colo. 1983), aff'd, 
75a F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984), is, among the welter of opinions 
published since Tarasoff, supra, the "best" case on the duty of a 
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psychotherapist to warn or control. It owes this status to its 
factual similarity to this case, to the quality of its 
reasoning—reasoning that is cast in a tone that bespeaks a trial 
judge going toe to toe with a tough issue. In Brady, the mental 
patient was John Hinkley, who shot the plaintiff, James Brady, in 
the course of Mr. Hinkley's assassination attempt on President 
Ronald Reagan. Mr. Brady claimed that Mr. Hinkley's outpatient 
psychiatrist, Dr. Hopper, owed him a duty to protect him from Mr. 
Hinkley's violent acts. Mr. Brady alleged that Dr. Hopper 
declined to hospitalize Mr. Hinkley over the objection of Mr. 
Hinkley's parents—affirmation of court in Hasenei v. United 
States, supra, that lack of control by the therapist and maximum 
freedom for the patient is often the objective of psychiatry. Mr. 
Hinkley never communicated to Dr. Hopper a threat against Mr. 
Brady or Mr. Reagan. Mr. Brady's complaint alleged that despite 
the absence of threats, Dr. Hopper should have discovered that Mr. 
Hinkley was armed, that he identified with the assassin in the 
movie "Taxi Driver," and that he was assembling books and articles 
on political assassinations. According to Mr. Brady's 
allegations, if Dr. Hopper had acquired knowledge of Mr. Hinkley's 
activities, he would have controlled Mr. Hinkley's behavior and 
avoided the assassination attempt. 
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The case came before the trial judge on Dr. Hopper's 
motion to dismiss, grounded on a claim that he owed no duty to Mr. 
Brady. The court recast the "special relationship11 analysis by 
asking "to what extent was Dr. Hopper obligated to protect these 
particular plaintiffs from this particular harm?" Id., 1338. The 
court was unwilling to obligate Dr. Hopper to protect the world at 
large. It narrowed the scope of Dr. Hopper's duty by applying the 
traditional foreseeability test announced by Justice Cardozo in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
The court reasoned that in this context, foreseeability was 
limited to the subjects of specific threats communicated by Mr. 
Hinkley. Because there were no allegations that Mr. Hinkley 
threatened President Reagan or Mr. Brady, there was no legal 
relationship between Dr. Hopper and Mr. Brady and, consequently, 
no duty or attendant liability. 
The same analysis is applicable to this case. The Brady 
court summarized its reasoning in a paragraph that merits, as an 
apt summary of Valley's arguments, quotation in full: 
The question of whether a legal duty should 
be imposed necessarily involves social policy 
considerations. (citation omitted) In the 
present case, there are cogent policy reasons for 
limiting the scope of the therapist's liability. 
To impose upon those in the counseling 
professions an ill-defined "duty to control" 
would require therapists to be ultimately 
responsible for the actions of their patients. 
Such a rule would closely approximate a strict 
»23-
liability standard 
be potentially lia 
persons presently 
treatment. Human 
unpredictable, and 
presently too inex 
scope of therapist 
the "specific thre 
states a workable, 
upon the sphere of 
third persons for 
of care, and therapists would 
ble for all harm inflicted by 
or formerly under psychiatric 
behavior is simply too 
the field of psychotherapy 
act, to so greatly expand the 
s1 liability. In my opinion, 
ats to specific victims" rule 
reasonable, and fair boundary 
a therapist's liability to 
the acts of their patients. 
Id, 1339. 
CONCLUSION 
Common law, social policy, clinical practices, and the 
unpredictability of human behavior all coalesce around the 
conclusion that the University and Salt Lake County defendants 
owed no duty to the Higgins. The trial court's judgment should 
therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this / ~~ day of March, 1991. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
ycgSjUt&4i 
Ronald E. Nehring 
Attorneys for VallejLMental Health 
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17-5-89. Mental health and substance abuse services. 
The board of county commissioners of each county shall provide mental 
health services in accordance with Chapter 12, Title 62A, and substance 
abuse services in accordance with Chapter 8, Title 62A. 
History: C. 1953, 17-5-89, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 181, § 1. Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch 181, § 30 makes the act effective on July 1, 1990. 
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64-7-1. Successor to state insane asylum. 
The state insane asylum now established and located at Provo in the county 
of Utah, shall be known as the Utah State Hospital. 
Historv: R.S. 1898. § 2153; L. 1903, ch. 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2153; C.L. 1917, § 5383; 
L. 1927, ch. 36, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
85-7-1. 
Cross-References. —- Establishment and 
support of institution, Utah Const., Art. XIX, 
Sec. 2. 
Guardians of incapacitated persons, 
§§ 75-5-101 to 75-5-105, 75-5-301 et seq. 
Inquiry into defendant's insanity, Chapter 
15 of Title 77. 
Land grants, Enabling Act, § 12; Utah 
Const., Art. XX. Sec. 1. 
Location of institution, Utah Const., Art. 
XIX, Sec. 3. 
Poor persons, order in which relatives liable 
for support, § 17-14-2. 
Sale of products, disposition of proceeds, 
§ 64-1-9. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The "Mentally 111" 
and the Law: Sisyphus and Zeus, James E. 
Beaver, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hospitals 
and Asylums § 1 et Beq. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Asylums and Institutional 
Care Facilities §§ 3, 4; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 4. 
Key Numbers. — Asylums «=> 2; Hospitals 
«=> 2. 
64-7-21. Unlawful introduction into mental health facility 
— Criminal and civil liability. 
Any person who attempts to introduce another into a mental health facility 
contrary to the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
besides being liable in an action for damages or subject to other criminal 
charges. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 2194; L. 1903, ch. 
115, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2194; C.L. 1917, § 5424; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,85-7-46; L. 1975, ch. 198, 
§ 11. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent 
Persons § 37. 
A.L.R. — Libel and slander: actionability of 
imputing to private person mental disorder or 
incapacity, or impairment of mental facilities, 
23 A.L.R.3d 652. 
Liability for malicious prosecution predi-
cated upon institution of, or conduct in connec-
tion with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 
455. 
Liability for false imprisonment predicated 
on institution of, or conduct in connection with, 
insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 523. 
64-7-34. Temporary admission to mental health facility — 
Requirements and procedures — Costs. 
(1) Any individual may temporarily be admitted to a mental health facility 
upon: 
(a) written application by a responsible person who has reason to know, 
stating a belief that the individual is likely to cause serious injury to self 
or others if not immediately restrained, and the personal knowledge of 
the individual's condition or circumstances which lead to such belief, and 
(b) a certification by a licensed physician or designated examiner stat-
ing that the physician or designated examiner has examined the individ-
ual within a three-day period immediately preceding said certification 
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and, because of the 
individual's mental illness, is likely to injure self or others if not immedi-
ately restrained. 
Such an application and certificate shall authorize any mental health or 
peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport the individual 
to a mental health facility. 
(2) If a duly authorized mental health officer or peace officer observes a 
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause to 
believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and that, 
because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a substantial 
likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending proceedings for 
examination and certification as provided in this act, the officer may take the 
person into protective custody. A peace officer may transport a patient pursu-
ant to this provision either on the basis of his own observation or on the basis 
of the observation of a mental health officer, reported to him by the mental 
health officer. Immediately thereafter, the officer shall transport the person to 
a mental health facility and there make application for the person's admission 
therein. The application shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the 
following: 
(a) a statement by the officer that the officer believes on the basis of 
personal observation or on the basis of the observation of a mental health 
officer reported to him by the mental health officer that the person is, as a 
result of a mental illness, a substantial and immediate danger to self or 
others. 
(b) the specific nature of the danger. 
(c) a summary of the observations upon which the statement of danger 
is based. 
(d) a statement of facts which called the person to the attention of the 
officer. 
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a maximum of 
24 hours excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. At the expiration 
of that time period, the person shall be released unless application for invol-
untary hospitalization has been commenced pursuant to § 64-7-36. If such 
application has been made, an order of detention may be entered pursuant to 
Subsection (3) of § 64-7-36. If no order of detention is issued, the patient shall 
be released, except when the patient has made voluntary application for ad-
mission. 
(4) Cost of all diagnosis and treatment under this section shall be paid by 
the county in which such person is found, unless the coimty participates in the 
state social services medical program as outlined in § 55-15a-3, in which 
event the state shall pay, or unless the person is financially able to pay the 
same in which event that person shall pay. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by L. 
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, 
ch. 159, § 1; 1971, ch. 172, § 8; 1975, ch. 198, 
§ 21; 1979, ch. 97, § 15; 1981, ch. 261, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment deleted "upon endorsement for such pur-
pose by a judge of the district court or a mem-
ber of the board of county commissioners of the 
county in which the individual is present" after 
"certificate" in the second paragraph of Subsec-
tion (1); inserted "officer" after "mental 
health" in the first sentence of Subsection (2); 
inserted the second sentence of Subsection (2); 
and inserted "or on the basis of the observation 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent 
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42. 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to 
34. 
of a mental health officer reported to him by 
the mental health officer" in Subsection (2)(a). 
Meaning of 'this act". — The term "this 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
1975, ch. 198, §§ 1 to 34, which appear as vari-
ous sections throughout Titles 26 and 64. See 
Table of Session Laws in Parallel Tables vol-
ume. 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 55-15a-3, 
cited in Subsection (4), is repealed. See 
§ 26-18-10. 
Cross-References. Limitation of applica-
tion as to criminally insane, § 64-7-54. 
Key Numbers. — Mental Health «=» 37 to 
46. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 64-7-36 
dations to the court regarding the order for involuntary hospitalization of the 
proposed patient. 
History: C. 1953, 64-7-35, enacted by L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1971, ch. 172, § 9), relating 
1979, ch. 97, § 16. to protective custody pending examination and 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1975, ch. 198, certification. 
§ 35 repealed former § 64-7-35 (C. 1943, Cross-References. — Admission to practice 
85-7-61, enacted by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. law, § 78-51-10. 
64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization on court order — Ex-
amination of patient — Hearing — Power of court 
— Findings — Costs. 
(1) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be 
commenced by the filing of a written application with the district court of the 
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found, by a responsible 
person who has reason to know of the condition or circumstances of the pro-
posed patient which lead to the belief that the individual is mentally ill and 
should be involuntarily hospitalized. Any such application shall be accompa-
nied by: 
(a) a certificate of a licensed physician or a designated examiner stat-
ing that within a seven-day period immediately preceding the certifica-
tion the physician or designated examiner has examined the individual 
and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally ill and should be 
involuntarily hospitalized; or 
(b) a written statement by the applicant that the individual has been 
requested to but has refused to submit to an examination of mental condi-
tion by a licensed physician or designated examiner. Said application 
shall be sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the 
application is based. 
(2) Prior to issuing a judicial order, the court may require the applicant to 
consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health professional 
from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the proposed 
patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the court. 
(3) If the court finds from the application, any other statements under oath, 
or any reports from a mental^iealth professional that there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that the proposed patient's mental condition and immediate 
danger to self, others or property requires involuntary hospitalization pending 
examination and hearing, or if the proposed patient has refused to submit to 
an interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court, or to 
go to a treatment facility voluntarily, the court may issue an order directed to 
a mental health officer or peace officer to immediately take the proposed 
patient to any mental health facility, or a temporary emergency facility as 
provided in Section [Subsection] 64-7-38(2), there to be detained for the pur-
pose of examination. Within 24 hours of the issuance of the order for examina-
tion, the clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee shall report 
to the court orally or in writing whether the patient is, in the opinion of the 
examiners, mentally ill, whether the patient has agreed to become a volun-
tary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, and whether treatment programs are 
available and acceptable without court proceedings. Based on such informa-
tion, the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceed-
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ings and dismiss the application. In any event, if the examiner reports orally, 
the examiner shall immediately send the report in writing to the clerk of the 
court. 
(4) Notice of the commencement of proceedings for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion, setting forth the allegations of the application and any reported facts, 
together with a copy of any official order of detention, shall be provided by the 
court to a proposed patient prior to, or upon, admission to a mental health 
facility or, with respect to any individual presently in a mental health facility 
whose status is being changed from voluntary to involuntary, upon the filing 
of an application for that purpose with the court. A copy of such order of 
detention must be maintained at the place of detention. 
(5) Notice of the commencement of such proceedings shall be provided by 
the court as soon as practicable to the applicant, any legal guardian, any 
immediate adult family members, the legal counsel for the parties involved, 
and any other persons the proposed patient or the court shall designate, and 
shall advise such persons that a hearing thereon may be held within the time 
provided by law, unless the patient has refused to permit release of such 
information in which case the extent of notice shall be determined by the 
court. 
(6) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual under 
the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written application with 
the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this section and said 
court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in the same manner and 
with the same authority as the district court. 
(7) If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district, 
the court may in its discretion transfer the case or patient's custody to any 
other district court within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will 
not be adverse to the interest of the proposed patient. 
(8) Within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal hol-
idays, of the issuance of a judicial order or after admission at a mental health 
facility of a proposed patient under court order for detention or examination, 
the court shall appoint two designated examiners to examine the proposed 
patient. If requested by the proposed patient's counsel, the court shall appoint 
as one of the examiners a reasonably available qualified person designated by 
counsel. The examinations, to be conducted separately, shall be held at the 
home of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any 
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's health. 
A time shall be set for a hearing to be held within ten court days of the 
appointment of the designated examiners unless said examiners or the clini-
cal director of the mental health facility shall inform the court prior to said 
hearing date that the patient is not mentally ill, that the patient has agreed to 
become a voluntary patient pursuant to § 64-7-29, or that treatment pro-
grams are available and acceptable without court proceedings in which event 
the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings 
and dismiss the application. 
(9) Prior to the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel shall 
be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor others 
provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel and allow sufficient time to 
consult with the patient prior to the hearing. In the case of an indigent pa-
tient, the payment of reasonable attorney's fees for counsel as determined by 
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the court shall be made by the county in which the patient resides or was 
found. The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom 
notice is required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the 
hearing, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court 
may in its discretion receive the testimony of any other person. The court may 
allow a waiver of the patient's right to appear only for good cause shown, 
which cause shall be made a matter of court record. The court is authorized to 
exclude all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings and may, 
upon motion of counsel, require the testimony of each examiner to be given 
out of the presence of any other examiners. The hearing shall be conducted in 
as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure and in a 
physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the mental health of the 
proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence 
which may be offered subject to the rules of evidence. 
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's care 
shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following information: 
the detention order, the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, 
the progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining to 
the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to the 
patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior thereto upon 
request. 
(10) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the hearing 
and consideration of the record, the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that: 
(a) The proposed patient has a mental illness; and 
(b) Because of the patient's illness the proposed patient poses an imme-
diate danger of physical injury to others or self, which may include the 
inability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and 
shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty; and 
(c) The patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-mak-
ing process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demon-
strated by evidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of 
treatment; and 
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court order 
of hospitalization; and 
(e) The hospital or mental health facility in which the individual is to 
be hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treat-
ment that is adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and 
needs. In the absence of the required findings of the court after the hear-
ing, the court shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings. 
(11) (a) The order of hospitalization shall designate the period for which 
the individual shall be treated. When the individual is not under an order 
of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, this period shall not exceed 
six months without benefit of a review hearing. Upon such a review 
hearing, to be commenced prior to the expiration of the previous order, an 
order for hospitalization may be for an indeterminate period, if the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the required conditions in 
Section [Subsection] 64-7-36(10) will last for an indeterminate period. 
(b) The court shall maintain a current list of all patients under its 
order of hospitalization, which list shall be reviewed to determine those 
patients who have been under an order of hospitalization for the desig-
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nated period. At least two weeks prior to the expiration of the designated 
period of any order of hospitalization still in effect, the court that entered 
the original order shall so inform the clinical director of the mental 
health facility responsible for the care of such patient. The director shall 
immediately reexamine the reasons upon which the order of hospitaliza-
tion was based. If the director and staff determine that the conditions 
justifying such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall dis-
charge the patient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate 
report thereof to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. Other-
wise, the court shall immediately appoint two designated examiners and 
proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) of this section. 
(c) The clinical director of a mental health facility or a designee respon-
sible for the care of a patient under an order of hospitalization for an 
indeterminate period shall at six-month intervals reexamine the reasons 
upon which the order of indeterminate hospitalization was based. If the 
clinical director or the designee determine that the conditions justifying 
such hospitalization no longer exist, the director shall discharge the pa-
tient from involuntary treatment and make an immediate report thereof 
to the court and the Division of Mental Health. If the clinical director or 
designee has determined that the conditions justifying such hospitaliza-
tion continue to exist, the director shall send a written report of such 
findings to the court and to the Division of Mental Health. The patient 
and the patient's counsel of record shall be notified in writing that the 
involuntary treatment will be continued, the reasons for such, and that 
the patient has the right to a review hearing by making a request to the 
court. Upon receiving the request, the court shall immediately appoint 
two designated examiners and proceed under Subsections (8) through (10) 
of this section. 
(12) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because of 
refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete such 
examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court shall fix a 
reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners for services 
in the cause. 
(13) Any person hospitalized under this act or a person's legally designated 
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of the 
court, shall have the right to a rehearing upon a petition filed with the court 
within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event the petition 
alleges error or mistake in the findings, the court shall appoint three impar-
tial designated examiners previously unrelated to the case who shall conduct 
an additional examination of the patient. The rehearing shall in all other 
respects be conducted in the manner otherwise permitted. 
(14) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the county 
in which the proposed patient resides or is found. 
History: C. 1943, 86-7-62, enacted by L. ment substituted "issuing a judicial order" in 
1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; 1963, Subsection (2) for "filing the application"; in-
ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971, ch. serted "or to go to a treatment facility volun-
172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22; 1979, ch. 97, tarily" and "or a temporary emergency facility 
§ 17; 1981, ch. 261, § 2. as provided in section 64-7-38(2)" in the first 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- sentence of Subsection (3); added the last three 
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sentences of Subsection (3); added the last sen-
tence of Subsection (4); deleted ''parent or" 
before "legal guardian" in Subsection (5); de-
leted "of a child or other person" after "legal 
guardian" in Subsection (5); deleted "with 
whom the proposed patient has been residing" 
after "members" in Subsection (5); added 
"unless the patient * * * court" to Subsection 
(5); substituted "issuance of a judicial order" in 
the first sentence of Subsection (8) for "filing of 
an application"; substituted "agreed to become 
a voluntary patient pursuant to section 
64-7-29" in the last paragraph of Subsection (8) 
for "become voluntary"; substituted "Prior to 
the hearing" in the first sentence of Subsection 
(9) for "At the hearing"; added "and allow suffi-
cient time * * * hearing^' to the first sentence of 
Subsection (9); inserted the fourth sentence of 
the first paragraph of Subsection (9); inserted 
"the detention order" in the first sentence of 
the last paragraph of Subsection (9); substi-
tuted "by clear and convincing evidence" in 
Subsection (10) for "beyond a reasonable 
doubt"; rewrote Subsection (11) which read: 
"The order of hospitalization shall state 
whether the individual shall be detained for a 
Utah Law Review. — Note: Hospitalization 
of the Mentally 111 in Utah: A Practical and 
Legal Analysis, 1966 Utah Law Review 223. 
The "Mentally 111" and the Law: Sisyphus 
and Zeus, James E. Beaver, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 
1. 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Attorney fees. 
—Indigents. 
Constitutionality. 
Former Subsection (6)(c) was unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad and violated due pro-
cess of law, since it allowed for the involuntary 
commitment of mentally ill individuals who 
were not a threat to themselves and/or were 
able to make rational decisions as to their own 
treatment. Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. 
Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979). 
Attorney fees. 
—Indigents. 
Attorney appointed by court to represent al-
temporary period not to exceed six months or 
an indeterminate period. If hospitalization for 
a designated temporary period is ordered, the 
patient shall not be retained for a longer period 
unless upon a hearing held pursuant to this 
section within such designated temporary pe-
riod. Unless otherwise directed by the court, it 
shall be the responsibility of the division of 
mental health to assure the carrying out of the 
order within such period as the court shall 
specify"; substituted "rehearing" in the first 
and last sentences of Subsection (13) for "new 
hearing"; deleted "in this act" at the end of the 
last sentence of Subsection (13); and made 
minor changes in punctuation. 
Meaning of 'this act". — See note under 
same catchline following § 64-7-34. 
Cross-References. — Juvenile court, com-
mitment by order of, § 78-3a-39. 
Legal capacity of children, Chapter 2 of Title 
15. 
Limitation of application as to criminally in-
sane, § 64-7-54. 
Re-examination of order for hospitalization, 
§ 64-7-45. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent 
Persons §§ 8 to 25, 39 to 42. 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14 to 
34. 
Key Numbers. — Mental Health *= 37 to 
46. 
legedly insane person was not entitled to re-
cover fee from county since lawyer was not nec-
essarily required to represent patient at invol-
untary hospitalization proceeding, notwith-
standing attorney's claim that provision re-
quiring appointment of counsel for indigent de-
fendants entitled attorney to recover reason-
able value of services from county. Bedford v. 
Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12,447 P.2d 193 
(1968) (decided prior to 1975 amendment). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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68-3-L Common law adopted. 
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict 
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws 
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural 
and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is 
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2488; Married women's property rights, § 30-2-1 et 
C.L. 1917, § 5838; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
 Seq. 
88-2-1. 
Cross-References. — Common-law crimes 
abolished, § 76-1-105. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Champerty. 
Contributory negligence. 
Corporate purchase of stock. 
Crimes against nature. 
Criminal law. 
Criminal procedure. 
Divorce and dower. 
Forcible entry and detainer. 
Married women. 
Statute of uses. 
Water rights. 
Writ of elegit. 
Compiler's Notes. — The following annota-
tions should be read with caution. The points of 
law expressed therein, while true when the 
cases were decided, may have been altered or 
rendered void by subsequent legislation or ju-
dicial opinion. 
Construction and application. 
This section, by implication at least, 
excludes common law from all subjects that are 
regulated by statute. Rio Grande, Western Ry. 
v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586 
(1909). 
The common law of England was not adopted 
in this territory or state until this section was 
enacted. Nor does this section adopt its rigor 
and harshness, but only so much as was and 
had been generally recognized and enforced in 
this country, and as is and was suitable to our 
conditions. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 
P. 1096 (1915). 
We adopted the common law of England only 
where it is suitable to our conditions, morals, 
history and background. Generally, we look to 
the system of common law and equity which 
prevails in and has been and is now being de-
veloped by the decisions of this country and we 
reject the common law of England which is not 
suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or 
ideals. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 
P.2d 94 (1959). 
Champerty. 
Common law on subject of champertous con-
tracts held modified by former statute provid-
ing that "measure and mode of compensation of 
attorneys and counselors at law is left to agree-
ment, express or implied, of parties." Croco v. 
Oregon Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 311, 54 P. 
985, 44 L.R.A. 285 (1898); Kennedy v. Oregon 
Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 325, 54 P. 988 (1898); 
Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 
999 (1900). 
Contributory negligence. 
The doctrine of contributory negligence has 
attained a status similar to a statutory enact-
ment, and abrogation should be by legislative 
365 
68-3-1 STATUTES 
enactment. Bridges v. Union Pac. R.R., 26 
Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 738, (1971). See 
§ 78-27-37. 
Corporate purchase of stock. 
Under English common law as adopted by 
Utah, a corporation could not purchase its own 
stock in absence of express statutory or charter 
authority. Shumaker v. Utex Exploration Co., 
157 F. Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1957). 
Crimes against nature. 
Because of this section it was held that the 
definition of the "infamous crime against na-
ture" with man or beast had to be sought in the 
common law in so far as not defined by crimi-
nal statute. State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18,137 
P. 632 (1913). 
Criminal law. 
Criminal statute covering phase of common 
law would not be construed as merely restating 
common law where wording indicated intent to 
broaden or change common law. Oleson v. 
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926). 
Criminal procedure. 
Common law applies to criminal procedure 
unless otherwise provided by statute; and 
§ 78-24-8(4), forbidding physician to testify 
without consent of his patient, does not apply 
to criminal proceedings, common law being ap-
plicable. State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 P. 
142 (1927). 
Divorce and dower. 
Under this section, common-law rule that a 
divorce a vinculo bars dower has been adopted. 
Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 1 P. 465 
(1881). 
Common law respecting dower remained in 
force during all time Utah remained a terri-
tory, and continued in force after it became a 
state, except as modified by statutory enact-
ment. Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 P. 
20 (1906). 
Forcible entry and detainer. 
The English statute (5 Richard, II) "was a 
part of the common law as adopted by the 
American jurisdictions." Buchanan v. Crites, 
106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 
(1944). 
Married women. 
The English common law, with its rigorous 
limitations imposed upon married women, was 
not adopted in the territory of Utah, but only 
so much thereof as was applicable to the condi-
tions of the new territory. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 
Utah 116, 148 P. 1096 (1915). 
The common-law right of the husband to sue 
another person for criminal conversation with 
his wife which was based on the theory of a 
trespass against the wife which had to be 
brought by the husband because he and the 
wife were one, is contrary to law on that sub-
ject as developed in this country on the concept 
of the rights of married women and such a 
right did not become part of the law of Utah by 
virtue of this section. However, the law of this 
state does authorize an action to recover dam-
ages for criminal conversation based on the ex-
clusive right of either spouse to intercourse 
with the other. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 
224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), distinguished, Black v. 
United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah 
1967). 
Notwithstanding this section, prior will of 
woman was not revoked by her subsequent 
marriage, contrary to rule at common law. Es-
tate of Armstrong v. Logan, 21 Utah 2d 86,440 
P.2d 881 (1968). 
Statute of uses. 
Although statute of uses never became part 
of English common law and has not been 
adopted by Utah Legislature, rule of law, 
which executes passive or naked trust and 
vests legal title in person having use, is part of 
Utah common law. Henderson v. Adams, 15 
Utah 30, 48 P. 398 (1897). 
Water rights. 
The Legislature, by this section, did not in-
tend to adopt the common-law doctrine as to 
riparian owners, thereby divesting itself of ti-
tle to bed of navigable waters. State v. Rolio, 
71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987 (1927). 
Writ of elegit. 
Writ of elegit did not exist in territory of 
Utah. Thompson v. Avery, 11 Utah 214, 39 P. 
829 (1895). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common 
Law §§ 13 to 18. 
C.J.S. — 15A CJ.S. Common Law §§ 11,13 
to 15. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Common Law «= 12. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Sundays and on Sunday or holiday, validity of, 63 A.L.R.3d 
Holiday § 70 et seq. 423. 
C.J.S. — 40 CJ.S. Holidays §§ 4 to 6. Key Numbers. — Holidays *=> 4 to 6. 
A.L.R. — Service of summons or complaint 
68-3-9. Seal, how affixed. 
When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law to be affixed to 
any paper, the word "seal" includes an impression of such seal upon the paper 
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the 
word "seal" may include a scroll printed or written. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2495; Great seal of the State of Utah, Utah Const., 
C.L. 1917, § 6845; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, Art. VII, Sec. 20; § 67-la-8. 
88-2-9. Municipal seals, § 10-1-202. 
Cross-References. — Custody of seals by Seals of courts, §§ 78-7-14, 78-7-15. 
archivist, § 63-2 to 62.5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Seals § 3. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Seals § 3. 
Key Numbers. — Seals «= 3. 
68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority. 
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers, or other 
persons, are to be construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, 
unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2496; Cross-References. — Personal representa-
C.L. 1917, § 5846; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, tives, majority concurrence required unless 
88-2-10. will provides otherwise, § 75-3-716. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Board of education. ties of a board of education. Tooele Bldg. Ass'n 
Joint authority is not "otherwise expressed" v. Tooele High School Dist. No. 1,43 Utah 362, 
in any statute prescribing the powers and du- 134 P. 894 (1913). 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are 
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appro-
priate meaning or definition. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497; Cross-References. — Duty of court to con-
C.L. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, struo statutes, § 78-21-3. 
88-2-11. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Court's duty. 
Meaning of word "maintain." 
Meaning of word "may." 
Supplying omissions. 
Title of act. 
Words used repeatedly in statute. 
Construction and application. 
Where there is doubt respecting true mean-
ing of certain words, then words should be read 
in light of conditions and necessities which 
they are intended to meet and objects sought to 
be attained thereby. United States Smelting, 
Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902 (1921). 
Presumption is that words are used in their 
ordinary sense and if a different interpretation 
is sought it must rest upon something in the 
character of the legislation or in the context 
which will justify a different meaning. Deseret 
Sav. Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 1114 
(1923). 
Unless technical terms are used, words em-
ployed in statute must be given their usual and 
ordinary meaning. Cache Auto Co. v. Central 
Garage, 63 Utah 10,221 P. 862,30 A.L.R. 1217 
(1923). 
Meaning of words found in statute must be 
determined from general context of the same 
and the intent or object sought to be accom-
plished by the legislation, and courts in at-
tempting to arrive at the intent of the Legisla-
ture will disregard mere forms and look to the 
substance. State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226 
P. 674 (1924). 
Words and phrases are to be construed ac-
cording to the context and the approved usage 
of the language; except in case of technical 
words and phrases, they must be construed ac-
cording to their plain and ordinary meaning, 
but technical rules of construction may be dis-
regarded where it is manifest, when the subject 
of legislation, considered from all points of 
view, is such as to convince the understanding 
that the Legislature could not have intended a 
literal interpretation. State v. Hendrickson, 67 
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 (1926). 
This section is merely declaratory of pre-ex-
isting rules of statutory construction. State v. 
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933). 
Definition of word may depend upon the 
character of its use in a statute. State v. 
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933). 
Unless contrary appears, terms of legislative 
enactment must be taken in their ordinary and 
usual significance as they are generally under-
stood. Emmertson v. State Tax Comm'n, 93 
Utah 219, 72 P.2d 467,113 A.L.R. 1174 (1937). 
Court's duty. 
It is duty of courts to enforce plain intent of 
statute, but courts ought not to construe an act 
to effect the forfeiture of property of one citizen 
to another, unless "plain and unequivocal 
mandate of the Legislature admits of no other 
rational construction." Rospigliosi v. Glenallen 
Mining Co., 69 Utah 41,252 P. 276 (1926) (con-
struing usury statute). 
In construction of statutes it is duty of courts 
to ascertain intent of legislative body, and in 
determining this intent, not only should lan-
guage of act be considered, but also purposes 
and objects sought by Legislature, and if legis-
lation is within constitutional power, to en-
force such intent. Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156, 
258 P. 1016 (1927). 
It is court's duty, when possible, to give to 
every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of 
statute a consistent, reasonable meaning. Rob-
inson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Meaning of word "maintain." 
In applying this section to the construction of 
word "maintain," the court said that that 
which is contained in statute by implication is 
as much part of statute as that which expressly 
appears therein. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah 
273, 46 P. 1096 (1896). 
Meaning of word "may." 
Word "may" as used in § 78-56-10, providing 
that judge of city court "may" employ short-
hand reporter upon request of any party, 
should be construed as discretionary, not man-
datory. Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah 467,195 P. 
547 (1921). 
Supplying omissions. 
In construing statutes court may supply 
manifest omissions in order to avoid absurd 
and mischievous consequences and to effect 
legislative intent. Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Pub-
lic Utils. Comm'n, 69 Utah 521, 256 P. 790 
(1927). 
Court may inquire into purpose sought to be 
accomplished in order to supply missing words 
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Words used repeatedly in statute. 
Word repeatedly used in statute will be pre-
sumed to bear same meaning throughout stat-
ute, unless there is something to show that an-
other meaning was intended. Merrill v. Spen-
cer, 14 Utah 273, 46 P. 1096 (1896); State v. 
Tingey, 24 Utah 225, 67 P. 33 (1902). 
The same words, especially if found in differ-
ent statutes, may not always have the same 
effect, and it follows that in order to determine 
intention and purpose of lawmaker, and to har-
monize conflicting provisions where such oc-
cur, it at times becomes necessary for courts to 
expand or to restrict ordinary and usual mean-
ing of words, phrases, or clauses found in par-
ticular section or statute. Board of Educ. of 
Carbon County School Dist. v. Bryner, 57 Utah 
78, 192 P. 627 (1920). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 178,179,188, 
§§ 204, 225 to 227, 238, 250. 192, 208. 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 314, 315,329, 
330, 348. 
68-3-12. General rules. 
In the construction of these statutes the following rules shall be observed, 
unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute: 
(1) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and 
the word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expres-
sion "year of our Lord." 
(2) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "af-
firm." Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the 
term "testify," and every written one, in the term "depose." 
(3) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the 
intent to authenticate any instrument or writing. 
(4) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and typewriting. 
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partner-
ships, associations, and companies. 
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singu-
lar. 
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the other. 
(8) Words used in the present tense include the future. 
(9) "Property" includes both real and personal property. 
(10) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements, 
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims. 
(11) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods, 
chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written instruments 
by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property is created, 
acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or dimin-
ished, and every right or interest therein. 
of statute, and words which are obviously nec-
essary to complete sense will be supplied to 
effect a meaning clearly shown by other parts 
of statute. Chez ex rel. Weber College v. Utah 
State Bldg. Comm'n, 93 Utah 538, 74 P.2d 687 
(1937). 
Title of act. 
While it is true that the title is not inte-
grated into the operating portion of legislation, 
and that it will not be permitted to contradict 
or defeat a plainly expressed intent, and that 
such title cannot be used to create an ambigu-
ity or uncertainty when the language in the 
body of the act is clear, nevertheless, where 
clarity is lacking in the language of an enact-
ment, the title may be considered to shed light 
upon and clarify the meaning. Great Salt Lake 
Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 
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CHAPTER 14a 
LIMITATION OF THERAPIST'S DUTY 
TO WARN 
Section 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
78- 14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to 
warn. 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter, "therapist" means: 
(1) a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine under Sections 58-12-26 
through 58-12-43, the Utah Medical Practice Act; 
(2) a psychologist licensed to practice psychology under Chapter 25a, 
Title 58; 
(3) a marriage and family therapist licensed to practice marriage and 
family therapy under Chapter 39, Title 58; 
(4) a social worker licensed to practice social work under Chapter 35, 
Title 58; and 
(5) a psychiatric and mental health nurse specialist licensed to practice 
advanced psychiatric nursing under Chapter 31, Title 58. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-101, enacted by 12, Title 58" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 42, § 15. 25a" for "Chapter 25" in Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 be-
ment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted "Sec- came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
tions 58-12-26 through 58-12-43" for "Chapter Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to warn. 
(1) A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protec-
tion from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client 
or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence 
against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall 
be discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the 
threat to the victim, and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the 
threat. 
(2) No cause of action arises against a therapist for breach of trust or privi-
lege, or for disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist's com-
munication of information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty in 
accordance with Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not limit or effect a therapist's duty to report child 
abuse or neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4-503. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-102, enacted by came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 be-
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